Search results for " Consensus Protocols"
showing 8 items of 8 documents
Distributed Consensus in Networks of Dynamic Agents
2006
Stationary and distributed consensus protocols for a network of n dynamic agents under local information is considered. Consensus must be reached on a group decision value returned by a function of the agents' initial state values. As a main contribution we show that the agents can reach consensus if the value of such a function computed over the agents' state trajectories is time invariant. We use this basic result to introduce a protocol design rule allowing consensus on a quite general set of values. Such a set includes, e.g., any generalized mean of order p of the agents' initial states. We demonstrate that the asymptotical consensus is reached via a Lyapunov approach. Finally we perfor…
Lazy consensus for networks with unknown but bounded disturbances
2007
We consider stationary consensus protocols for networks of dynamic agents. The measure of the neighbors' state is affected by Unknown But Bounded disturbances. Here the main contribution is the formulation and solution of what we call the isin-consensus problem, where the states are required to converge in a tube of ray isin asymptotically or in finite time.
Dissensus, death and division
2009
The modeling of switching systems describing networks where death and duplication processes occur is described. A dissensus protocol, complementary to consensus protocol, is introduced and the convergence or divergence of the agents' state evolution is studied. We discuss some properties of the topology reached by the network when different rules of duplication and inheritance are implemented.
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR OPTIMAL CONSENSUS PROBLEMS
2006
We consider stationary consensus protocols for networks of dynamic agents with fixed and switching topologies. At each time instant, each agent knows only its and its neighbors’ state, but must reach consensus on a group decision value that is function of all the agents’ initial state.We show that our protocol design is the solution of individual optimizations performed by the agents. This notion suggests a game theoretic interpretation of consensus problems as mechanism design problems. Under this perspective a supervisor entails the agents to reach a consensus by imposing individual objectives. We prove that such objectives can be chosen so that rational agents have a unique optimal proto…
Toward a Society of Robots: Behavior, Misbehavior, and Security
2010
In this article, we consider how a very large numbers of robots, differing in their bodies, sensing, and intelligence, may be made to coexist, communicate, and compete fairly toward achieving their individual goals, i.e., to build a society of robots. We discuss some characteristics that the rules defining acceptable social behaviors should possess. We consider threats that may be posed to such a society by the misbehaviors of some of its members, either due to faults or malice, and the possibility to detect and isolate them through cooperation of peers. The article presents examples of motion control protocols, for arbitrarily large groups of heterogeneous robots. We discuss intrusion dete…
Challenging aspects in Consensus protocols for networks
2008
Results on consensus protocols for networks are presented. The basic tools and the main contribution available in the literature are considered, together with some of the related challenging aspects: estimation in networks and how to deal with disturbances is considered. Motivated by applications to sensor, peer-to- peer, and ad hoc networks, many papers have considered the problem of estimation in a consensus fashion. Here, the unknown but bounded (UBB) noise affecting the network is addressed in details. Because of the presence of UBB disturbances convergence to equilibria with all equal components is, in general, not possible. The solution of the epsiv-consensus problem, where the states…
Distributed Consensus in Noncooperative Inventory Games
2009
This paper deals with repeated nonsymmetric congestion games in which the players cannot observe their payoffs at each stage. Examples of applications come from sharing facilities by multiple users. We show that these games present a unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium that dominates all other Nash equilibria and consequently it is also the social optimum among all equilibria, as it minimizes the sum of all the players’ costs. We assume that the players adopt a best response strategy. At each stage, they construct their belief concerning others probable behavior, and then, simultaneously make a decision by optimizing their payoff based on their beliefs. Within this context, we provide a …
Noncooperative dynamic games for inventory applications: A consensus approach
2008
We focus on a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game where the stage cost of a single player associated to a decision is a monotonically nonincreasing function of the total number of players making the same decision. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize Nash equilibria and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multi-stage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately not necessarily Pareto optimal. The algorithm returns a seque…